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Abstract:  In exchange for loans from international financial institutions, natural resources 
companies should be made contractually responsible for achieving specific primary health care 
targets in certain developing countries they invest in.  Primary health care is crucial for 
social/economic development, but many developing countries’ governments fail in its provision.  
Any effort to make natural resources companies responsible for primary health care would need 
to focus on goal setting, monitoring and legal enforcement.  The latter would include both 
monetary sanctions and incentives tied to specific targets.  The challenges facing this project are 
significant, but none are problematic enough to prevent its implementation.
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3Section I:  Introduction
One of the vicious cycles facing developing countries is the interaction between their 
poverty and inadequate primary health care systems that under-perform because of corruption, 
inadequate resource allocation and other failures.  The absence of primary health care in turn 
contributes to sub-standard economic performance by reducing the effectiveness of the country’s 
work force.  These failures can also impact the broader international community—as diseases 
jump borders and health failures in one country lead to epidemics in others.  Developing 
countries’ sub-standard economic and primary health care performance extends to those 
countries blessed with significant natural resource deposits, despite the significant revenues these 
natural resources can generate.  A key challenge for international financial institutions and the 
broader development community is addressing this shortfall between the promise of natural 
resource wealth and broader economic and social development.  One way of doing this is more 
closely linking natural resources investment and development of key social programs like 
primary health care.  
In recent years, the World Bank, IMF and other international financial institutions have 
been experimenting with diverse programs that aim to stimulate economic growth in developing 
nations.1  In creating these programs, international financial institutions have to grapple with 
diverse priorities and special challenges.  Some of the most important include:  The importance 
of social development (e.g. primary health care) to human and economic development;2
1
 These types of projects can range from financing training for journalists, Paul Lewis, World Bank Emphasizes Role 
of Free Media in Fighting Graft, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1998, at 21, to coordinating efforts to get developed nation to 
finance primary education in poorer countries, Elizabeth Becker, Meeting to Focus on Poverty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 
2004, at C2, to helping pressure developing countries to reveal oil payments, Heather Timmons, Angola Set to 
Disclose Payments From Big Oil, N.Y.TIMES, May 13, 2004, at W1. 
2 See, e.g., WORLD BANK GROUP, WORKING FOR A WORLD FREE OF POVERTY 3 (2003), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/wbgroupbrochure.pdf.
4continued, significant corruption and incompetence on the part of developing country 
governments;3 and the critical role of natural resources in many developing country economies.4
Different programs have attempted, with varied success, to link these factors with the dynamism 
that private industry often brings to its operations.5  This paper proposes extending these 
experiments by explicitly linking the development of natural resources with improvements in 
primary health care.  In return for loan guarantees and assistance from international financial 
institutions, private natural resource companies would be held legally responsible for meeting 
particular criteria linked to social development.  While developing country governments’ input 
and approval would be essential to the plan, and it would include a variety of measures to 
promote local ownership, the consequences of meeting or failing to meet these targets would be 
born by the natural resource companies involved.
Making private sector corporations responsible for the promotion of a basic government 
responsibility like primary health care is a radical step.  It expresses a profound critique of many 
developing countries’ governments’ abilities and honesty.  But the record of economic 
development since decolonization has often been so dismal6 as to make this step worth 
exploring, at least in the short run.  In contrast to developing country governments, private sector 
corporations are often extremely competent at efficiently using resources to achieve their ends.7
Tying private corporations’ profits to improvements in primary health care could lead to
3 See, e.g., WORLD BANK GROUP, REFORMING PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS AND STRENGTHENING GOVERNANCE (2000) 
[hereinafter Governance]; WORLD BANK GROUP, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION (1997) [hereinafter 
Public Institutions].
4 See, e.g., WORLD BANK GROUP, TREASURE OR TROUBLE?  MINING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2002).
5 See, e.g., Paul Lewis, A New World Bank: Consultant to Third World Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1995, at D4.
6
 For example: “Sub-Saharan Africa faces enormous poverty…(and) almost across the board the story is one of 
stagnation…[e]conomies have not grown, half of Africans live in extreme poverty…and about one-sixth of children 
die before age five—the same as a decade ago”.  UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003 at 37 (OUP 2003) 
available at http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/pdf/hdr03_complete.pdf [hereinafter HDI Report].
7
 See discussion in Section III C.  This competence extends to the health sector.  The government of Mozambique, 
for example, increased vaccination coverage and prenatal consultations by 80% partially through the use of private 
sector providers.  See HDI Report, supra note 6, at 2.
5significant improvements in the both life expectancy and quality of life for local populations in 
resource-rich developing nations.  Health care in general and primary health care in particular 
have been identified by numerous experts as a core requirement for both human and economic 
development.8  It is an important component of the UNDP Human Development index and is 
also a key requirement for promoting broader economic activity.9  Primary health care, while a 
complex undertaking, is also relatively separated from certain cultural and nationalistic tensions 
inherent in the private provision of other key social services, like education.10
Although placing significant responsibility for primary health care targets in the hands of 
corporations is a radical concept, making them responsible for health care on a small scale is not.  
Natural resources companies have significant experience in promoting social programs in 
regions where they locate facilities and within their workforces.11  Both developing country 
governments and international financial corporations have also experimented in making private 
industry a catalyst for social change.12  In Chad, the World Bank made funding of an oil pipeline 
contingent on allocation of oil revenues to particular areas of social development, with the 
8 See, e.g., John Strauss & Duncan Thomas, Health, Nutrition and Economic Development, 36 JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMIC LITERATURE 766 (1998); T. Paul Shultz, Health and Schooling Investments in Africa,13 JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 67 (1999); DEON FILMER ET. AL., HEALTH  POLICY IN POOR COUNTRIES: WEAK LINKS IN 
THE CHAIN (World Bank, Working Paper No. 1874, 1998) (“There is broad consensus that a mix of public health, 
preventive and simple curative activities provided through low-level facilities is the right policy for public 
expenditures on health in developing countries.”); DAVID E. BLOOM ET. AL., THE EFFECT OF HEALTH ON ECONOMIC 
GROWTH:  THEORY AND EVIDENCE (National Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8587, 2001); DESMOND 
MCCARTHY ET. AL., THE GROWTH COSTS OF MALARIA 20 (National Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
7541, 2000); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999).
9 See, e.g., Ravi Kanbur & Lyn Squire, The Evolution of Thinking About Poverty:  Exploring the Interactions, in
FRONTIERS OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 183, 200-02 (Gerald M. Meier & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2001), Strauss, 
supra note 8 at 768; MCCARTHY, supra note 8 at 20; Shultz, supra note 8 at 85; HDI Report, supra note 6. 
10
 Education almost inevitably includes a strong element of nationalism and nation building absent from primary 
health care interventions—See, e.g., BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES:  REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN 
AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (1983).
11
 Shell’s programs in the Niger Delta are an example of this, spending tens of millions of dollars on community 
development—though this investment faces criticism and obstacles.  See, e.g., Robert Lenzner, Damned if You Do, 
FORBES, Nov. 27, 2000.
12
 These experiments include multinational oil companies BP and Shell, examples of which are discussed in Section 
IV.
6agreement of private sector participants and the government.13  In South Africa, the government 
has legally compelled private corporations to participate in efforts to promote economic 
development in its black population.14  While not always welcoming these programs, private 
sector corporations have adapted to and accepted these efforts.15
This paper proposes that in return for loan guarantees from international financial 
institutions, private sector corporations (almost certainly in the natural resources sector) 
guarantee to meet a series of key performance targets in primary health care.  Depending on their 
success in meeting these targets, they would be either rewarded or penalized.  Before any loans 
were extended or projects begun, representatives of all interested parties, as well as civil society 
groups would agree to the terms of any plan.  Any plan would include explicit stages 
encompassing goal setting, monitoring and enforcement activities.  Any plan for primary health 
care promotion could exist alongside other commitments to regional development, payments to 
the developing country government and other programs.
Section II of this paper places the proposal in the context of relevant legal and non-legal 
literature and addresses some of the immediate normative considerations that challenge this 
proposal.  Section III explores the context of this proposal—the importance of economic 
development and primary health care, developing country governments’ poor record in 
promoting these and the capabilities of private sector corporations.  Section IV of the paper 
explores in more detail previous experiments in encouraging private sector corporations to 
support broader social goals.  The successes and challenges these efforts faced are key to 
13 See generally, Genoveva Hernandez Uriz, To Lend or Not To Lend: Oil, Human Rights, and the World Bank's 
Internal Contradictions, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 197 (2001); World Bank, The Chad-Cameroon Petroleum 
Development and Pipeline Project: Question and Answers, Why is the Bank Group Involved?, at
http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/questions [hereinafter World Bank, Questions and Answers].
14 See, e.g., Itumeleng Mahabane, On the Dating Scene, FINANCIAL MAIL, Apr. 30, 2004, at 60.
15 Id.
7understanding what types of innovations will be successful in new programs.  Section V outlines 
the proposal in detail, examining goal setting, monitoring and legal enforcement activities.  
Section VI explores various legal and non-legal challenges the proposal will face, and explains 
why they should not stop this proposal from being implemented.  Section VII suggests next steps 
and broader applications of the program discussed in Section V.
Section II:  Existing Scholarship and Normative Considerations
a.  Existing Scholarship
While there have been articles about spurring economic development in poorer countries, 
no serious proposals have been made that would make natural resource companies responsible 
for primary health care in the countries where operate.  Instead, as discussed in the paragraphs 
that follow, there have been general works discussing (and often criticizing) particular projects; 
critiquing the current natural resource extraction processes; critiquing trade agreements and 
international financial institutions for causing problems to developing countries; and 
recommending  increased control of natural resource revenues by the international community.  
These proposals, though sometimes contradictory, often contain valuable commentary about the 
problems facing developing nations.  Potentially because of the normative problems sketched out 
in the second part of this section however, they avoid giving additional responsibility to natural 
resource companies.
The project most discussed by academics and in international development circles is the 
Chad oil pipeline project.16  Discussed extensively in Section III, this project has been both 
praised for its innovative attempt to make international financing contingent on socially 
16 See, e.g., Uriz supra note 13;  Genoveva Hernandez Uriz, The Application of the World Bank’s Standards to the 
Oil Industry, 28 BROOKLY J. INT’L L. 77 (2002); Dana L. Clark, Boundaries in the Field of Human Rights:  The 
World Bank and Human Rights:  The Need for Greater Accountability, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 205 (2002).
8beneficial use of oil revenues and criticized for specific instances where the Chadian government 
either ignored or manipulated the control system it had agreed to.  The World Bank and the IMF 
have also been criticized for providing support to other projects that either led to significant 
human rights abuses or led to corruption.17  But the Chad oil pipeline project has been their most 
ambitious attempt to influence the use of natural resource revenues and has attracted the most 
attention in recent years.
Both legal and non-legal authors have heavily criticized the current arrangements for 
natural resources extraction and identified their negative impact on developing countries.18
These authors have commented on the frequent failure of countries with natural resources to 
develop at appropriately high rates—and identified the high social cost this entails.19  Natural 
resources have been linked to a wide range of problems, including corruption, power struggles, 
wars and various additional problems.20  These pieces are often less focused on solving than on 
pointing out particular problems with natural resource extraction.  But when they do propose 
solutions, these include more private control for natural resources,21 greater transparency in 
17 See, e.g., Uriz, supra note 13. 
18 See, e.g., Uriz, supra note 13, James C. Owens, Note, Government Failure in Sub-Saharan Africa:  The 
International Community’s Options, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1003 (2003);  PAULINE JONES LUONG, RETHINKING THE 
RESOURCE CURSE: OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY (Yale Center for Int’l and Area Studies, 
Working Paper, 2003) (“The proposition that abundant mineral resources…are more often a curse than a 
blessing…is by now so familiar that it has become doctrine”); TERRY LYNN KARL, THE PARADOX OF PLENTY:  OIL 
BOOMS AND PETRO-STATES (1997).
19 See, e.g., XAVIER SALA-I-MARTIN & ARVIND SUBRAMANIAN, ADDRESSING THE NATURAL RESOURCE CURSE:  AN 
EXAMPLE FROM NIGERIA (National Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9804, 2003); CARLOS LEITE & 
JENS WEIDMANN, DOES MOTHER NATURE CORRUPT? NATURAL RESOURCES,
CORRUPTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (IMF, Working paper WP/99/85, 1999); JEFFREY D. SACHS & ANDREW M. 
WARNER, NATURAL RESOURCE ABUNDANCE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (National Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 5398, 1995).
20 See, e.g., GLOBAL WITNESS, TIME FOR TRANSPARENCY 2-7 (2004), available at http://www.globalwitness.org/ 
reports/show.php/en.00049.html; Leite, supra note 17; Sachs, supra note 17.
21 See, e.g., Luong supra note 18.
9transfers between natural resource companies and governments22 and additional international 
control of developing country resources.23
From the left wing of academia, commentary on development focuses on the social 
misery and neo-colonial24 implications of international agreements on issues like trade and 
restrictions on budget spending by international lenders like the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).  Authors adopting this perspective specifically criticize 
“adjustment” and “investment” programs by international financial institutions for leading to 
human rights abuses, for limiting the sovereignty of developing country governments, and for 
causing social misery among the poor.25  These pieces also advocate initiatives like an increased 
focus on social welfare and legal rights when making loans and grants to developing nations26 as 
well as questioning the very idea of whether development as currently conceptualized is 
necessary or appropriate.27
A more coercive genre of scholarly work on developing countries acknowledges the 
manifest failures of developing country governments and recommends more coercive solutions 
to the problems facing developing nations.  These types of solutions include more international 
22 See, e.g., GLOBAL WITNESS, supra note 20, at 79-95. 
23 See, e.g., Owens, supra note 18, at 1033-49; For a more personal view and discussion see Jon H. Sylvester, Sub-
Saharan Africa:  Economic Stagnation, Political Disintegration, and the Specter of Recolonization, 27 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1299 (1994).
24 See, e.g., Theophilus Fuseini Maranga, The Colonial Legacy and the African Common Market:  Problems and 
Challenges Facing the African Economic Community 10 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 105 (1993); Ruth E. Gordon and 
Jon H. Sylvester, Deconstructing Development, 22 WIS. INT’L L. J. 1 (2004);  Tayaab Mahmud, Postcolonial 
Imaginaries:  Alternative Development or Alternatives to Development 9 T RANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29 
(1999); Charles R. P. Pouncy, Stock Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa:  Western Legal Institutions as a Component of 
the Neo-Colonial Project 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 85 (2002).
25 See, e.g., Rajesh Swaminathan, Note, Regulating Development:  Structural Adjustment and the Case for National 
Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 161, 181-89, 195-97 (1998); Jonathan 
Cahn, Challenging the New Imperial Authority?  The World Bank and the Democratization of Development 6 HARV. 
HUM. RTS. J. 159, 160-61 (1993). 
26 See, e.g., Swaminathan, supra note 25, at 209-12.
27 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 24.
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control of natural resources revenues,28 using debt relief as a way to achieve desired reforms29
and increased focus on non-governmental civil society partners in economic development.30
Even though these recommendations are not shy about discussing potentially coercive measures, 
they hesitate to recommend that natural resource companies be given responsibility for important 
social functions like primary health care.  As discussed in more detail in sections III and IV, this 
timidity ignores the fact that natural resource extraction companies possess unparalleled 
knowledge, influence and even social welfare know-how in developing countries.  The most 
likely reasons for this refusal to make the link are a number of normative concerns explored in 
the second part of this section.
A second set of literature discusses making nations and private companies liable for legal 
action outside their country of origin.  The literature shows increasing theoretical acceptance and 
practical proposals for persecuting those responsible for human rights abuses,31 as well as 
litigating disagreements over investment disputes.32  There is also some discussion of actually 
enforcing economic and social rights in court,33 but these efforts are considerably less advanced.  
Individual governments and even firms can potentially be sued in national courts for human 
rights abuses, and are often liable to international arbitration proceedings when investments do 
28 See, e.g., Owens, supra note 18, at 1033-49.
29 See, Eric A. Friedman, New Development, Debt Relief in 1999:  Only One Step in a Long Journey 3 YALE H.R. & 
DEV. L. J. 191, 198-200 (2000).
30 See, e.g., Richard Cameron Blake, New Development, The World Bank’s Draft Comprehensive Development 
Framework and the Micro-Paradigm of Law and Development, 3 YALE H.R. & DEV. L.J. 159 (2000).
31 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347 (1991); Anne-Marie 
Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiff's Diplomacy, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 102 (2000); Eric Marcks, Avoiding Liability for 
Human Rights Violations in Project Finance, 22 ENERGY L. J. 301 (2001) (discussing the liability of corporations in 
US courts for human rights violations associated with their operations abroad); 
32
 In this case, international arbitration is increasingly preferred as a means of solving disputes, and required by the 
relevant contracts.  See, e.g., Dinesh D. Banani, Note, International Arbitration and Project Finance in Developing 
Countries:  Blurring the Public/Private Distinction, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 355, 361-63 (2003).  For a 
pessimistic view on its effectiveness in this role, see Amr. A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World:  A Plea 
for Reasessing Bias Under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. INTL. L. J. 419 (2000).
33 See, e.g., Michael J. Dennis and David P. Stewart, Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:  Should 
There be an International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing and Health?,
98 A.J.I.L. 462 (2004).
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not proceed as planned.  But governments are much less liable to international legal sanction for 
misusing the money they gain from these projects.
b.  Normative Concerns
Making private sector natural resource companies responsible for the provision of 
primary health care carries significant costs, even if accomplished with the acquiescence of all 
concerned parties.  As outlined in the paragraphs below, there are significant risks that removing 
spending power from developing country governments could decrease the ability of often-weak 
central governments to exert control and command respect from the general population.  There 
are also significant concerns about the democratic legitimacy of private sector companies when 
providing an essential public service.  Less theoretically, there is the concern that private sector 
providers of essential services may put profits over principle and shortchange affected 
populations.  Finally, some commentators have expressed fear of the consequences of creeping 
privatization.  Despite the validity of these concerns, this paper will argue that there are ways to 
decrease these risks, and that the crisis in the proper use of natural resource revenues and in the 
provision of primary health care renders any remaining costs acceptable.
The most basic challenge to the idea of making natural resources companies responsible 
for primary health care provision is whether the benefits of any improvements in primary health 
care are worth the inevitable weakening of developing country governments’ authority.  
Developing country governments often have weak governance structures in the first place,34 and 
removing their ability to distribute patronage and provide citizens’ with basic services like 
primary health care could significantly reduce national unity as well as the government’s ability 
to achieve any other goals—at least some of which the international community supports.  
34 See, e.g., Public Institutions supra note 3, at xi.
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This basic challenge to removing primary health care functions from national 
governments addresses the very heart of this project’s rationale.  At a fundamental level, this 
project assumes that most developing country governments are so corrupt and incompetent at 
providing key social services like primary health care that weakening their authority will have 
only a limited negative impact on the general population.  It also assumes that primary health 
care is extremely significant for social and economic development and that natural resource 
companies will achieve real improvements in its provision.  
Unfortunately, the record of many developing countries in the provision of all social 
services, including primary health care, is so poor as to justify weakening their authority.35  More 
broadly, somewhat competent governments will probably cooperate with natural resource 
companies, who will have a financial incentive to promote and even fund existing government 
programs when these are already efficient.  These incentives will support the authority of 
competent governments and undermine that of governments whose service provision is 
inefficient and corrupt.  Primary health care is also so important36 that significant improvements 
in its provision seems worth some weakening of central authority—especially when this 
weakening is only a possibility, not a certainty.  Primary health care is also not a key component 
of national identity and values—at least not to the same extent as educational services, another 
key component of social/economic development.  Finally, the private sector’s record in the 
developing world suggests a real ability to produce results,37 especially when these are necessary 
35
 Obviously where the line should be drawn with regards to justifying removal of authority differs depending on the 
commentator.  This note will not spend a lot of time articulating a definite line—it suffices to agree that there are 
some countries which do fall into this category.  Chad, discussed in Section IV, would be one country that outside 
institutions like the World Bank have deemed worthy of additional restrictions.   
36 See, e.g., Strauss supra note 8, Filmer supra note 8, Shultz supra note 8.
37 See discussion is sub-section III c.
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to produce profits.  Given these facts, the tradeoff between government authority and provision 
of primary health care seems acceptable.
Beyond the impact of this project on central governments, there are also legitimate 
concerns about the appropriateness of having natural resources companies be responsible for 
primary health care provision.  In particular, making a private sector corporation responsible for 
this basic service raises the questions of whether it is sufficiently democratically accountable,38
whether the natural resource companies will be tempted to deliver substandard health care in 
order to increase corporate profits, and whether this “privatization” of primary health care would 
be the precursor to the outsourcing of many other basic government services.
The most effective way of addressing concerns about democratic accountability lies in 
structuring a project that allows significant local commentary and input about the work 
accomplished by the natural resource company.  It is true that developing country citizens rarely 
have any voice in the decisions of natural resource companies’ management or shareholders, 
given their relative poverty and absence from senior managerial ranks.39  But Section V 
describes a number of key aspects to this proposal--specifically “goal setting”, “monitoring” and 
“enforcement”—that involve important roles for local civil society organizations as well as 
substantial oversight of the work accomplished by this project.  In a final analysis, a government 
would also retain the right to stop the entire project from continuing—if it was willing to bear the 
impact of international finance companies recalling loans and/or the natural resource company 
withdrawal from its territory.  Beyond these basic safeguards, there is also a comparative point—
38 See,e.g., Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229 (2003); John Tagliabue, 
As Multinationals Run the Taps, Anger Rises Over Water for Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2002, at A1.
39
 For example in BP, a major oil company, only 18% of staff in Global Leadership positions were from outside the 
US or UK in 2003, despite the company’s extensive global operations.  This was, however, an improvement from 
2002 when the percentage was 16%.  See, BP, Diversity at
http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2011555&contentId=2016939.
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that developing country citizens often have very little say over their natural resources even today.  
A large number of resource rich, impoverished nations are governed by autocratic governments 
which give their citizens very little voice in the operation of these projects.40  In these cases, 
outside interference in the allocation of oil revenues might make the spending more, not less 
accountable.
A second concern about assigning natural resource companies specific targets involves 
their priority on making profits rather than improving health care.  It is certainly true that 
charitable work is not the main goal of these companies.  But again, the plan outlined in Section 
V includes a lengthy discussion of incentive planning and output monitoring, along with legal 
enforcement, which should align companies’ profits with achieving primary health targets set in 
cooperation with governments, international financial institutions, and civil society members.  
Additionally, given the corruption and inefficiency discussed in Section III, even if natural 
resource companies spend a significantly lower amount than governments currently budget, they 
may do a better job providing primary health care, provided that the spending actually reaches 
communities rather than being wasted or stolen.
A final normative objection to assigning natural resource companies responsibility for 
provision of primary health care is the fear that this will begin an inevitable slippery slope 
process involving the privatization of major government functions.  This is certainly possible, 
especially if primary health care provision improves as a result of this initiative.  Of course, 
additional privatization in response to improved services would not necessarily be a bad thing—
and could improve other developing country services as well.  It could be that a mass 
privatization of key functions could precipitate problems like government weakness in the way 
40
 Out of the countries ranked as “Low Human Development” by the UNDP, only four score as “Free” on Freedom 
House’s annual ranking.  See HDI Report, supra note 6 at 237-41, FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2004 
at 243-44 (2004), available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/ freeworld/2004/table2004.pdf.
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that a single plan like the one advocated here would not.  But the balancing act required for these 
decisions is not the responsibility of those advocating this proposal—and should be left for 
potential future debate.
Section III:  Context
The failure of many developing country governments to provide primary health care 
services compares unfavorably with private sector corporations’ success in managing complex 
operations in these same countries.  This observation is a key motivation for transferring 
responsibility for primary health care development to private companies.  Managing primary 
health care is a complex enterprise, but private sector corporations have frequently proved able 
to address challenges of equal complexity.  The largest private sector investors in most 
developing nations are those developing natural resources.  They have extensive experience with 
large scale projects and unusual influence with their host governments.  These private sector 
corporations are thus the ideal partners in any plan to make the private sector responsible for 
meeting primary health care expansion goals.  This section will explain why primary health care 
is such an important government service, trace the corruption and inefficiency which currently 
plague many resource rich developing countries, point to the special capabilities of private sector 
corporations in developing countries and highlight the key role of natural resource investments in 
these same countries.  This will provide an appropriate context for considering the role that 
private sector natural resource companies can play in delivering primary health care in 
developing countries.
a.  Importance of primary health care  
16
Expansion of primary health care is crucial for most developing countries.  The health of 
a country’s people is vital to their overall well being and is also important in assuring economic 
development.  Primary health projects in particular target the poorest of citizens with the most 
cost-efficient services—improving basic indicators of national health like maternal and infant 
mortality.  Primary health care usually does not produce prestige projects—like major hospitals 
that donors and governments can showcase.  It often gets ignored for this reason.  International 
development institutions have recognized the importance of primary health care to overall 
wellbeing of the general population.
Three of the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) eight millennium goals 
focus on issues related to primary health care.41  Fully one third of the UNDP’s Human 
Development Index (HDI) is based on life expectancy at birth, a statistic closely related to 
primary health care availability.42  More broadly, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
academic analyses have suggested that good quality primary health care which benefits the poor 
is highly correlated to better health outcomes and higher per capita income.43
Primary health care projects are particularly beneficial to social development because 
they usually address basic health problems faced by the very poor.  These basic health problems 
can often be addressed at relatively low cost by simple preventative and treatment measures.  
Campaigns to expand vaccination, prompt prevention and treatment for diseases like malaria and 
other relatively cheap measures can yield significant improvements to overall population health 
41
 Three of the eight major millennium goals set by the UNDP are directly related to primary health care—reducing 
infant and maternal mortality and combating HIV/AIDS and other diseases.  Metrics used to calculate this include 
the number of deaths in childbirth, infant mortality at ages one and five and inoculation rates.  HDI Report, supra
note 6, at 15-16, 220-21.
42 Id., at 349.
43 See, e.g., DAVOODI, HAMID R. ET AL., HOW USEFUL ARE BENEFIT INCIDENCE ANALYSES OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 
AND HEALTH SPENDING (IMF 2003); Strauss, supra note 8, at 767-68.
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and consequently to economic development.44  Richer, more influential populations often face 
health challenges that are more complex an expensive, like cancer, heart problems and the like.  
While addressing these challenges is important, addressing primary health care needs generally 
results in the most benefit to the most people.45
Certain developing country governments focus on prestige health care projects that do not 
cost-effectively address primary health care challenges.  Researchers have documented a 
tendency to focus on items like expensive new hospitals and equipment for dealing with 
complicated diseases prestige at the expense of primary health care.46  These types of high-tech 
initiatives address local elites’ health concerns more directly than expanded primary care, which 
targets the very poor.47  In many less developed nations, “[i]t is safe to say that targeting health 
spending to the poor…would require spending less on hospitals and more on primary care 
facilities.”48
b. Corruption, Inefficiency and Developing Countries
Even resources that are devoted to basic health and education are often wasted and stolen 
by corrupt and incompetent bureaucracies.  Corruption in particular can mean that even resources 
that are officially devoted to sectors like health care are actually allocated to private 
consumption.  Numerous studies have suggested that corruption is a particular problem in many 
lesser developed countries.  Incompetence can also sabotage spending on programs like primary 
care.  Government bureaucracies, particularly in lesser developed countries, are often dominated 
by staff whose appointments depend on political patronage rather than competence.  Especially 
44 See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 8 at 25.
45 See FILMER, supra note 8 at 3, 3 n.3.
46 Id. at 2;  see also F. Castro Leal et al., Public Spending on Health in Africa:  Do the Poor Benefit?, 78 BULL. OF 
THE WORLD HEALTH ORG. 66 (2000).
47
 Studies on a number of African countries showed that health care resources were concentrated on the tertiary 
rather than the primary level, and that health care subsidies provided significantly more benefits to the richest 20% 
of the population than to the 20% poorest.  Id. at  68-69.
48 Id. at 69.
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in fields that do require technical expertise, like primary health care, having political appointees 
make key decisions can lead to inefficient allocation of resources.  
Corruption has been identified as a major obstacle to economic development.49  Though it 
takes numerous forms (ranging from enormous kickbacks in contract bidding to low level 
payoffs for policemen and others) its overall impact is almost always considered damaging for 
any economy.50  Corruption also seems particularly endemic to the state sector.  Civil servants’ 
salaries are often relatively low, making them particularly susceptible to bribes when allocating 
government benefits.  This type of corruption is particularly endemic to developing countries and 
exists even in relatively low profile sectors like primary health care.51
Developing countries are particularly susceptible to corruption.52  Significant 
opportunities exist allowing corruption—often including high monopoly rents, great discretion 
for public officials, significant portions of the economy in the hands of the government and poor 
accountability.  The combination of these factors, alongside the great poverty of many 
developing nations, means that both that those susceptible to corruption are presented with both 
motivation and opportunity.53
Some of the most corrupt developing countries (and, ironically, some of the least 
developed as well) are those relying on natural resources for all funding—like oil and diamonds 
49 See, e.g., TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2002 302-03 (2003) [hereinafter 
CORRUPTION].
50 See, e.g., Klitgaard, Subverting Corruption, 37 FIN. & DEV. 2 (2000); Robert Klitgaard, Combating Corruption, 
UN CHRON., 90, March 22, 1998 (discussing how different levels of corruption are associated with different levels 
of harm); SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT:  CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM 2 
(1999).
51 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 45, at 71-84; Sanjeev Gupta et al., Corruption and the Provision of Health Care 
and Education Services, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION 111 (Arvind K. Jain ed., 2001).
52 See id., at 1-3.  All of the countries classified by the UNDP as having “low human development” based on their 
HDI scores that were included in Tranparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index ranked in the bottom 
half.  See CORRUPTION, supra note 49, at 302-03; HDI Report, supra note 6, at 243-44.
53
 See, e.g., Cheryl W. Gray and Daniel Kaufmann, Corruption and Development, FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT, 
March 1998, at 7.
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in Angola.54  In these countries, society sometimes becomes wholly focused on the wealth 
generated by natural resources.  The absence of other types of private sector activity means that 
government revenues are even more central to private individuals’ wealth creation plans.55
The provision of health care is usually a significant expenditure for developing country 
governments and is thus subject to pressures from private individuals willing to steal/misuse 
public funds.56  While primary health care expenditures do not usually include major projects 
like large hospitals—with the inevitable opportunities for corrupt bidding and other income 
diversion schemes that these bring—the diffuse nature of this type of expenditure inevitably 
makes central monitoring harder.  The large number of localities that need services like 
clinics/vaccinations increases the number of expenditures and also increases the number of 
individuals with access to government funds.57  The diffuse nature of this spending provides 
many more opportunities for corruption.  In the aggregate, small thefts of primary health funds 
can significantly constrict activities undertaken.58
Government funded primary health care also suffers from other inefficient practices.  In 
particular, political patronage and nepotism often help determine staff allocation to government 
programs, especially in countries where government expenditure plays a significant role in the 
54
 Nigeria for example is ranked 101 out of 102 in Tranparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, 
CORRUPTION, supra note 49 at 302-03.  At the same time, the Nigerian government derives 65% of its budget 
revenues from oil. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK 2003 (2003), available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ni.html.  See also, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SOME 
TRANSPARENCY, NO ACCOUNTABILITY:  THE USE OF OIL REVENUE IN ANGOLA AND ITS IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS
(2004) available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/angola0104/. [hereinafter Transparency].
55 See generally THORVALDUR GYLAFSON, GYLFI ZOEGA, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH:  THE 
ROLE OF INVESTMENT 8-10 (Central Bank of Chile, Working Paper No. 142 2002).
56
 Though it can often be below the level considered necessary by NGOs/IOs, it is still a significant expenditure.
57
 For example, usage surveys show that theft of government provided medicines is a significant problem in many 
developing countries.  Gupta, supra note 51 at 118.
58
 An example of the effect that corruption on spending meant to reach a large number of recipients is a large 
Ugandan program in the mid and early1990s meant to provide a “capitation” grant to cover schools’ nonwage 
expenditures.  A survey of schools showed they received only 13% of the grants with much of the school grant 
“captured” by local officials.  See Ritva Reinikka & Jakob Svensson, Local Capture:  Evidence from a Central 
Government Transfer Program in Uganda 679 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 119 (2004).  See also Gupta, 
supra note 51.
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economy.59  Primary health care, with its diffuse hiring practices and need for local 
representatives is particularly accommodating to political interference in which relatives/clients 
of politicians and government officials are placed in appointed positions.  Especially when 
combined with actual theft, this type of practice can significantly undermine the effectiveness of 
primary health care investments channeled through the government.  In general, corruption and 
poor governance structures are often endemic in government funded activities carried out in 
developing countries.60  Government provided primary health care is not magically exempt from 
these problems.
c. Special Skills of the Private Sector
The private sector in underdeveloped countries possesses special skills that often surpass 
those of government actors.  In particular, various private sector companies are able to operate in 
remote locations within developing countries in a way that maintains profitability and a 
competitive return on equity to investors.  Additionally, the private sector has demonstrated an 
ability to provide health care and other services to particular groups within underdeveloped 
countries—their employees and the communities in which their facilities are based.  
While many underdeveloped countries have a relatively small private sector, almost all of 
them have a number of private international sector actors who are able to make profits.  These 
include consumer product, communication and above all natural resource extraction companies 
that earn significant profits in developing countries.61 These companies are able to adjust to 
59
 This is particularly probable when natural resource wealth is a major or overwhelming presence in the economy.  
For more discussion on the broader probability and effects of corruption, see GYLAFSON, supra note 16.
60 See, e.g., Governance, supra note 3; Public Institutions, supra note 3.
61
 Examples include:  Celtel, with headquarters in the Netherlands and telecom operations in 13 African countries 
and profits in 2003 of $74 million on revenues of $446 million, see Marina Bidoli, Loudest Ring on the Continent, 
FINANCIAL MAIL, Jun. 4, 2004, at 44; BP announced that Angola would be one of its five “profit centers”, see BP 
Reaffirms Focus on Core Areas to Drive Upstream Growth, INTERNATIONAL OIL DAILY, Jun. 9, 2004.; Guinness 
distributes more beer in Africa than in the UK with its Nigerian operations alone making a profit of $71 million in 
2003, see Ciaran Hancock, Sales of Guinness Grow Stout in Africa, SUNDAY TIMES, Apr. 18, 2004, Business 1.   
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numerous logistical obstacles—poor transportation and communication networks, frequent 
power outages and the like—and produce profits that satisfy shareholders.62
Private sector actors also operate throughout developing countries—not just in national 
capitals.  Consumer products companies, for example, distribute goods like beer throughout 
many underdeveloped countries.63  Natural resource companies in particular have no choice but 
to explore and extract resources where they occur—often in very rural areas far from traditional 
transportation and communication links--and they innovate relatively low-cost techniques for 
communicating with and transporting goods to whatever remote areas where they operate.64
Faced with the inability of governments in developing countries to provide adequate 
social services, private sector actors in many developing countries are also accustomed to 
providing additional services to key population segments.  For example, natural resource 
companies often provide their employees with health care and other goods/services needed to 
maintain an acceptable quality of life (especially for western expatriate personnel…).  Similarly, 
natural resource companies often invest in the areas where their facilities are located, providing 
support for services like education and health care.65
Private sector actors have a long tradition of providing services like health care to their 
employees.  In South Africa for example, mining companies provided retroviral drugs to 
employees carrying the HIV virus before the government agreed to do this for the general 
62
  For publicly held private corporations, like major natural resources and consumer products companies, 
shareholder pressure will generally ensure that operations not generating sufficient profit are ended.
63 The Road to Hell is-Unpaved, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 21, 2002 [hereinafter Beer].  
64 See, e.g., Nick Selby, Growth (with challenges) for the satellite services industry, INTERNATIONAL HERALD 
TRIBUNE, Oct. 13, 2003, at 10.
65 See, e.g., ROYAL DUTCH/SHELL GROUP, MEETING THE ENERGY CHALLENGE:  THE SHELL REPORT 2002 at 38 
(2002), available at http://www.shell.com/html/investor-en/reports2002/doc/pdf/sr_full.pdf. [hereinafter SHELL 
REPORT].  In Nigeria for example, Shell supported 29 permanent medical facilities treating 135,000 people in 2003.  
See, SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY OF NIGERIA LTD, 2003 PEOPLE AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2003) 
[hereinafter Shell Nigeria].
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population.66  Even beyond the example of HIV, natural resource companies in particular 
provide health care services to key parts of their workforce in developing countries.67  As private 
companies, they have a vested interest in finding health care providers who can provide services 
at the highest quality for the lowest cost.
Private corporations also have experience supporting the provision of health care and 
other social services to specific communities in developing countries.  Multinational oil 
companies, for example, often decide to invest resources in communities that they locate 
extraction/exploration facilities in.68  The type of health care initiatives supported are often those 
most appropriate to poorer areas—e.g. primary health care.  
d.  Resource Flows to Developing Countries
Private sector foreign investment in developing countries is heavily focused on natural 
resources.69  These investments often turn into large scale enterprises that involve significant 
commitments of funds and significant involvement with the governments concerned.  
The significant investments required for natural resource development projects usually 
force the companies that make these investments to interact heavily with the countries in which 
they operate.  Especially in sectors like petroleum, where investments can cost billions of dollars, 
natural resource companies cooperate with local government, private sector and civil society 
66 See, e.g., Peter Clarke, City View: Mining a Noble Seam, EVENING NEWS (Edinburgh), Aug. 7, 2002 at 2. 
67 See, e.g., SHELL REPORT, supra note 65, at 32.
68 See, e.g., id. at 36.
69
 Substantial investments into developing countries are often focused on the natural resources sector.  Even when 
considering the least developed countries, a significant number have impressive natural resources within their 
territories.  The low average incomes in these countries mean that they are relatively unattractive markets in 
themselves.  The logistical problems that face any private sector actor—communications, transport and others—also 
make it less likely that private sector actors who do not have to locate there will.  Natural resources companies, 
unlike most other private investors, often have fewer choices about where they invest.  While they can choose 
whether to invest in particular developing countries, they usually have no choice about working in at least some of 
them.  The lack of other investors (in addition to the large size of many investments in natural resources) often 
makes them the largest foreign investors by default.  These natural resource rich, Least Developed Countries would 
certainly include Angola, Chad, the DRC, Liberia and Sierra Leone.  See generally GYLFASON, supra note 55 at 4-6.  
See also David Blumental, Sources of Funds and Risk Management for International Energy Projects, 16 BERKELEY 
J. INT’L L. 267 (1998).
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actors in order to assure the security of their investments.70  This kind of interaction provides 
natural resource companies with a rich knowledge base about how to operate successfully within 
the particular political, economic and social context of the country in which they invest.71  This
knowledge, along with efficient business practices, allows natural resource companies to achieve 
their goals more effectively than most other actors.72
The fact that developing country governments often rely on natural resource revenues for 
a substantial proportion of their budgets makes them particularly responsive to requests by these 
companies.73  While both companies and governments need the other party, multinational natural 
resource companies often have much more flexibility when choosing projects than do national 
governments, which are constrained by their geography and poverty.  As a result, natural 
resource companies are justifiably assumed to wield great influence on the policies of developing 
country governments.74
Natural resource companies’ significant influence in developing countries is not matched 
by any other private sector actor.  Efforts to promote primary health care initiatives (and many 
other social programs) need to acknowledge these companies’ prominence and use the resources 
they manipulate to achieve their goals.  Their local knowledge and economic influence over 
developing world governments and civil society institutions is unmatched.  International 
financial institutions are increasingly recognizing that the social/political goals which they 
70 See, e.g., See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF OIL  (1999), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria/ [hereinafter Price of Oil]
71 Id.
72 See, e.g., Beer, supra note 63.  More broadly, private sector foreign corporations are very efficient in choosing 
what they need to know.  Their focus will be on cultural features/practices relevant to their business—their 
expatriate staff in particular may seem quite cut off from non-business focused realities of the countries they operate 
in.
73 See, e.g., Price of Oil, supra note 70 at 2-4.
74 See, e.g., Id.; Multinationals and their Morals, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 2, 1995 at 18 [hereinafter Multinationals].
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pursue require the cooperation and support of large investors in developing countries—the 
natural resource companies.75
Section IV:  Attempting to Mobilize the Private Sector in Developing Countries
a. Introduction
There have been significant and sometimes successful attempts to make the private sector 
a partner in achieving social change/improvement in developing countries.  These efforts have 
relied on different means, including publicity, legal sanctions, incentive schemes and other tools.  
But though there are examples of private sector companies possessing and sometimes realizing 
the capability to play integral roles in social programs of developing countries, attempts to 
harness the private sector to achieve change have often faced obstacles.  One example of efforts 
to influence corporations is provided by NGOs’ publicity campaigns against Talisman Energy in 
Sudan.  Another is a World Bank effort to ensure that the government of Chad uses its oil 
revenues in ways that directly benefit its general population, rather than diverting these funds to 
uses with less broad social utility.  Though both these examples showcase problematic projects, 
they also underscore attributes that could prove key to successfully mobilizing the private sector:  
working cooperatively with the private sector and deemphasizing national government 
participation in projects.
b. Involving the Private Sector in Social Change
1. Case Study on the Talisman Energy Experience
One cautionary example of corporate interactions with social goals is the campaign against 
Talisman Energy in Sudan.  Talisman Energy’s operations were associated with significant 
human rights abuses and were perceived as not contributing to its surrounding community.  NGO 
pressure on Talisman led it to leave Sudan—ending its association with human rights abuses.  
75 See discussion of Chad oil project in Section III for an example of these efforts.
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But Talisman was replaced by an Indian oil firm less vulnerable to NGO pressure.  NGOs 
decision to push for disinvestment and attack Talisman—rather than work with it to improve 
conditions in Sudan—ironically led to a situation where the international community ended up 
with much less leverage to lobby for improved social policies.  This case study underscores the 
importance of calibrating pressure to ensure that private sector responses improve conditions in 
developing countries.
Talisman Energy’s operations in Sudan were a major source of support for the Sudanese 
government.76  Efforts to ensure that oil operations in southern operations in Southern Sudan 
were not disrupted included killings, bombings and other human rights abuses.77  Revenues from 
these oil investments were primarily used for military spending.78  While the company engaged 
in social development programs79, NGOs and other groups harshly criticized the company’s 
operations in Sudan.  As part of a campaign to promote disinvestment, they launching lawsuits,80
issued hostile media attacks,81 and initiated shareholder actions.82  As a result, Talisman decided 
to sell its stake in Sudanese oil operations.83
76 See, e.g., Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Sudan:  Oil Companies Complicit in Rights Abuses (Nov. 25, 
2003), available at http://hrw.org/press/2003/11/sudan112503.htm [hereinafter OIL COMPANIES COMPLICIT].
77 See generally, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SUDAN, OIL, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2003), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/sudan1103/sudanprint.pdf.
78 See OIL COMPANIES COMPLICIT, supra note 76 (“the major share (60 percent) of the US$580 million received in 
oil revenue by this poverty-stricken country in 2001 was absorbed by its military, both for foreign weapons 
purchases and for the development of a domestic arms industry”).
79 See,e.g., TALISMAN ENERGY, 2002 CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 11 (2003), available at
http://www.talisman-energy.com/pdfs/TLM02CR.pdf.
80 See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
81
 An example of which is a form letter to Canadian Parliament members posted on the web.  See Letter from Gary 
Kenny, Chairperson, Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group, to Member of Parliament (Canada) (Feb. 13, 2001) 
available at http://www.web.net/~iccaf/humanrights/sudaninfo/memparl0201.htm (“We note with dismay that 
Canada's premier upstream oil and gas exploration and development company, Talisman Energy, is a 25% partner in 
Sudan's Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company . . . . [w]e believe oil development, in the midst of a vicious 
civil war, is completely unacceptable”).
82 See, e.g., TALISMAN ENERGY, supra note 79, at 3.
83 Id.
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Talisman’s decision to divest of its Sudanese operations actually decreased the leverage 
possessed by the international community.  Oil investments were sold to an Indian petroleum 
company84 that is significantly less vulnerable to western public pressure and thus less motivated 
to pursue even minimal social/human rights programs than the Canadian owned Talisman.85  The 
large scale campaign against Talisman Energy, while emotionally satisfying, did not improve the 
situation in Sudan—it simply led to changes in ownership, which even supporters of the 
campaign against Talisman saw as unhelpful.86  This cautionary example illustrates the 
importance of working with corporate entities—and the limits of pressure that can be brought 
onto them.  Western natural resource companies are often much more amenable to pressure than 
developing country governments or corporations.87  But efforts to influence them need to take 
into account their profit making goals—and desire to preserve their corporate reputations—by 
providing intermediate options that allow them to maintain profitability.  Otherwise, they may 
follow the example of Talisman and decide to divest controversial assets to actors less 
susceptible to outside pressure.
2. Case Study on the Chad Oil Pipeline Project
One of the most ambitious efforts to involve the private sector in delivering social 
benefits to developing nations has been the World Bank funded Chad oil pipeline project.  The 
World Bank made its funding of this oil pipeline contingent on the government of Chad and the 
oil companies’ agreement that revenues from the project would be allocated by a Board with 
84
 British Broadcasting Corporation, Talisman Promises Sudanese Sale (Mar. 5, 2003) at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2821045.stm.
85
 Responding to the sale of Talisman’s stake, Andrew Pendleton of Christian Aid commented that “We wanted 
them to halt production but not to leave and hand over to someone (ONGC) who will be harder to bring to account”.  
Pressed Talisman Quits Sudan, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 1, 2002, at 29.
86 Id.
87
 Responding to protests over ONGC’s takeover of Talisman’s Sudan holdings, India’s oil minister argued that 
India’s energy needs were more important than “possible protests”.  Katy Salmon, Development:  Rebels Caution 
India on Sudan Oil Investment, IPS, Jul. 2, 2002.  
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representatives of all parties according to pre-determined criteria.  This was supposed to prevent 
the government of Chad from misusing the funds it was allocated.  The project achieved some 
notable successes—however, the income allocation encountered significant problems, leading to 
the suspension of World Bank funding.  While these problems are due to a variety of factors, the 
difficulties in controlling a sovereign government has been a particularly significant.
The Chad oil pipeline project was advertised by the World Bank as a new prototype in its 
poverty alleviation strategy.88  The project consists of developing three oilfields (Miandoum, 
Kome and Bolobo) in the Doba basin of southern Chad, and building a pipeline to export the oil 
through Cameroon to the Atlantic ocean.89  The oil consortium that initially developed this 
proposal (led by ExxonMobil and initially including Chevron and Petronas) was unwilling to 
invest unless it could obtain World Bank loan guarantees.90  These were crucial to lowering the 
overall financing costs of investing in a very unstable region.91
The World Bank was wary about providing loan guarantees to the project.  The 
government of Chad had a very poor human rights record and was also known for diverting 
funds away from social programs towards spending categories not perceived as beneficial to 
Chad’s people.92  But in return for significant concessions to its budget allocation preferences, 
the World Bank agreed to provide financing to both the governments of Chad and Cameroon and 
the private sector consortium, through the International Bank for Reconstruction and 




 World Bank, The Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project: Project Overview, at
http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/project/pro_overview.htm [hereinafter World Bank, Project Overview].
90 WORLD BANK, CHAD-CAMEROON:  PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT AND PIPELINE PROPOSAL, PROJECT APPRAISAL 
DOCUMENT 20-23 (Apr. 13, 2000), 19343-AFR, available at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ ccproj/ project/ 
tdpppad.pdf [hereinafter PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT];  see also Uriz, supra note 13.
91 See Susanne Breitkopf, The Chad Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project:  Risky Business, 2000 
(Center for International Environmental Law and Urgewald), 2000; Uriz, supra note 13.
92 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CHAD: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - 1999, Feb. 2, 
2000, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/234.htm [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -
1999], Uriz, supra note 13, at 218-19.
28
Development (IBRD) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) respectively.  Total 
funding by these organizations was about $192.9 million, with some assistance in raising 
additional amounts also offered.93
The most innovative conditions for the World Bank’s support involved the use of 
revenues from the project.  Chad’s government was entitled to compensation amounting to at 
least 12.5% of the price of crude oil produced by the project (and potentially additional taxes).94
But before the World Bank was willing to approve the project, it required that Chad’s 
government pass a Revenue Management Law, outlining socially beneficial use of the income 
generated.  This law required that direct revenues be deposited into an escrow account.  Ten 
percent of these revenues are supposed to be saved “for future generations”, Seventy two percent 
spent on priority sectors (e.g. public health, social affairs, education etc.), 4.5% spent on the 
people of the Doba basin and the rest allocated to the government operating expenses.95  The 
disbursement of these funds is supposed to be controlled by an Oil Revenues Control and
Monitoring Board, which includes representatives from the judiciary, government and civil 
society.96
Theoretically, the revenue management structure approved by the World Bank 
considerably lessened the ability of Chad’s government to redirect funds in ways that do not 
benefit the general population of the country.  But the structure of the board actually made it easy 
for the government of Chad to use the funds in ways that were not socially optimal. The Oil 
93 World Bank Group Approves Support for Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project, No. 
2000/395/AFR (World Bank Press Release), June 6, 2000, at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ ccproj/news/ 
index.htm.
94
 Thomas Sotinel, Le Tchad Face aux Sirenes Petrolieres, LE MONDE, Sept. 3, 1998, at 13.
95 Loi de Gestion des Revenus Petroliers [Oil Revenue Management Law], No. 001/PR/99 (Chad), translated in
PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT, WORLD BANK, CHAD-CAMEROON:  PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT AND PIPELINE 
PROJECT, PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT 101-04 (Apr. 20, 2000).
96 Id;  Uriz, supra note 13, at 222-25.
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Revenues Control and Monitoring Board’s makeup was obviously subject to manipulation.97
While it is meant to have a mix of government and independent representatives, the Board was 
actually composed of two Members of Parliament, four high ranking officials and two civil 
society representatives.98  Given the undemocratic reality of Chad, this meant government 
control of allocations with few opportunities to appeal.  An International Advisory Group (IAG), 
set up to help maintain the Board’s independence has the power to point out problems but limited 
enforcement means.  But the allocation of funds was still in the hands of Chad’s government—
subject to the corruption and incompetent allocation.
An additional problem with the revenue control board is that there are almost no limits on 
how money allocated to particular social categories is actually spent.  Thus there are no legal 
limitations on preferential allocation of funds to certain regions (e.g. those where the president 
derives his support) or on the type of projects that are actually funded.  This led to the potential 
for massive corruption and nepotism.  The Chadian government’s past record did not suggest it 
will make special efforts to ensure that the money is well spent.  In fact, the international 
monitoring of initial allocations rather than impact of spending provided strong incentives to the 
Chadian government to divert funds at lower levels towards measures that directly support its 
political and other goals.  Animosity between northern and southern regions of Chad, with the 
north dominating politics99 and the south producing oil, mades government control of the social 
spending even more problematic.
The Chadian government’s actions on receiving its “welcome bonus” did not suggest that 
it intended to respect the Revenue Management Law.  The government spent half of the $25m 
(spell out) it received without using the allocation mechanism required the law.  Even more 
97 See, e.g., Uriz, supra note 13, at 224.
98 Id.
99 Uriz, supra note 13.
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troublingly, $4.5m (spell out) of this amount was spent on arms, not one of the socially optimal 
categories envisioned by its agreement with the World Bank.100 While public outcry and World 
Bank intervention stopped this particular derogation by the Chadian government, it demonstrated 
the ability of Chad’s government—and developing countries in general--to ignore national 
legislation.  Chad, in particular, decided to abrograte its agreement and increase spending on its 
military, leading to the suspension of World Bank loans in early 2006.101  The future of the oil 
project was unclear.
Despite the manifest and clear weaknesses of its revenue allocation plan, the Chad oil 
pipeline project’s requirements were groundbreaking.  The Chadian government and the 
multinational oil companies involved accepted an intrusive and detailed revenue allocation 
arrangement once they realized that initial, vaguer plans were not acceptable to the World 
Bank.102  In return for a relatively small scale loan, the World Bank achieved a much higher level 
of monitoring than would traditionally have been acceptable for a sovereign government.  The 
Achilles heal of the project turned out to be the difficulties the World Bank faced in controlling 
the activities of a sovereign government, even after it agreed to monitoring.
c.Extending Private Sector Involvement in the Provision of Social Services
Given private companies’ profit making focus, their willingness to adapt to changing 
profit making incentives is not surprising. Western multinational natural resources corporations, 
with international reputations and asset holdings, are also vulnerable to concerted pressure by 
NGOs and governments.  Similarly, international financial institutions and even large 
100
 Babette Stern, Le Tchad A Achete des Armes avec l'Argent du Petrole, LE MONDE, Nov. 22, 2000, at 5.
101
 Press Release, World Bank, World Bank Suspends Disbursements to Chad (Jan. 6, 2006), available at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/CHADEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20778
928~menuPK:349881~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:349862,00.html; Celia W. Dugger, World Bank 
Suspends Loans to Chad Over Use of Oil Money, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 7, 2006.
102 Stern, supra note 100.
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international NGOs also have reputational concerns and are vulnerable to regulation by the 
international community.  In contrast, national governments like Chad’s, with few assets and a 
problematic global reputation to begin with, have little to lose from global condemnation and are 
thus able to more easily flout their international obligations.103  The independence enjoyed by 
national governments also means that it is much harder to prevent them from abrogating 
agreements, as the government of Chad’s eventual actions in the Pipeline project demonstrated.  
These facts suggest that the next step in promoting critical emergency social 
programs/economic development may involve less engagement with national governments.  
Especially when dealing with governments like Chad’s, that consistently violate international 
community norms on issues ranging from corruption to human rights,104 it may be necessary to 
limit their participation in spending of funds in order to assure that revenue allocation programs 
are successful.  Instead, groups composed of multinational companies, civil society 
representatives and international financial institutions may be most effective in promoting social 
and economic development.  Their international reputations and asset bases make them more 
vulnerable to international sanction, and thus more likely to follow through with their 
commitments.  For example, private corporations are relatively vulnerable to enforcement of 
international arbitration decisions.  Large natural resource companies possess far-flung 
international holdings105 that could be vulnerable in the event that they were assessed penalties 
103
 On a broader scale, the pressure Chad comes under to improve human rights may not be that great in any case.  
Oona Hathaway, writing about human rights law but in comments relevant to this case, has commented that “a 
nation’s actions against its own citizens do not directly threaten or harm other states…[thus] countries have little 
incentive to police noncompliance with treaties or norms.”  Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a 
Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1938 (2002).  
104
 See, e.g., PRICE OF OIL, supra note 70; Uriz, supra note 13, at 219-20.
105 See, e.g., ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM COMPANY, ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2003 at 22 (2004) (listing 
diverse countries where new investments are being made and operations are continuing—these include Germany, 
the United States and Mexico).
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for not meeting pre-agreed primary health care targets.106  Beyond the slightly hazy idea of 
reputation integrity, the real possibility that national legal systems will enforce contracts and 
international arbitration makes natural resources companies more reliable interlocutors than 
developing country governments with very limited assets abroad.107
In the past, national sovereignty concerns and suspicion of multinationals’ intentions 
might have torpedoed efforts to expand the role of private companies at the expense of national 
governments.  But the poor record of developing country governments in respecting the rights of 
their peoples, the same governments’ abandonment of traditional national sovereignty concerns 
in order to attract investment and the expanding role of private corporations suggests that it will 
be possible to make private corporations responsible not just for producing revenues efficiently 
but also allocating at least some of them in a fairer and more productive manner.
Section V:  Proposal
a. Introduction
The inability of many developing country governments to provide primary health care to 
their citizens suggests that radical change is needed in the way that these services are allocated 
and funded.  Making natural resource companies that invest in developing countries 
contractually responsible for the provision of at least some of these services would yield 
significant benefits.  With the establishment of an appropriate regulatory framework, this type of 
arrangement would leverage these companies’ ability to operate efficiently, their influence with 
developing country governments, and their susceptibility to outside monitoring and pressure.
106
 International arbitration rulings are increasingly being enforced in national courts.  See, e.g., Jane L. Volz & 
Roger S. Haydock, Foreign Arbitral Awards:  Enforcing the Award Against the Recalcitrant Loser, 21 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 867 (1996).   
107
 The tragicomic saga of a Ukrainian government plane being seized in a dispute with a private corporation 
illustrates the paucity of foreign holdings owned by developing country governments.  Mikhail Melnik, Crew Leaves 
Ukrainian Jumbo Plane Arrested in Belgium, ITAR-TASS NEWS AGENCY, Aug. 22, 2004
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A successful program linking primary health care provision and natural resource 
exploitation could have a very significant impact.  Adhering to guidelines previously agreed to, 
natural resource companies would make a significant commitment to expanding primary health 
care opportunities in the developing countries they invested in.  These resources would be 
invested with a minimum of corruption and inefficiency in order to protect the private 
corporation’s profits.  The government of the country would also have incentives to cooperate, 
out of concern for its citizens welfare but also in order to promote good relations with the 
corporation responsible for producing much of the income used for the government’s own 
activities.108  Eventually the primary health care investment would result in significantly 
improved health for the entire population.  Failing to meet targets would carry sufficiently 
significant financial consequences that the company concerned would not permit shortfalls 
because of bureaucracy, lack of resources or a desire to make short term cost savings.  Better 
primary health care would improve not just the overall well being of the general population but 
also aid general economic development, as the workforce became less prone to disease and could 
participate in additional wealth generating activities.109
In order for the program discussed above to be successfully implemented, international 
financial institutions will need to link their participation in natural resource development projects 
with the assumption of primary health care responsibility by natural resource companies.  As 
discussed earlier, primary health care is a sector where investment is very important but all too 
108
 This is a key reason for requiring the corporation to undertake responsibility for achieving specific targets, rather 
than simply requiring payments to a third party.  Ideally, the corporation will use the influence it possesses as a 
major contributor to government revenues in order to achieve the targets it has committed to meet.
109
 The ideas sketched in this section obviously face significant practical challenges—these are addressed in Section 
VI.
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often not successfully implemented.  It is also relatively removed from cultural sensitivities,110 at 
least in comparison to sectors like education.111  Primary health care is thus an ideal sector within 
which to develop the program discussed above.
International financial institutions whose funding is required to permit natural resource 
projects to go forward would need to consider three core issues when making natural resource 
companies responsible for aspects of primary health care in a developing country: Goal setting, 
Monitoring and Enforcement.  Addressing these issues will ensure that natural resources 
companies are set appropriate targets, meet them and are subject to rewards and penalties that 
deter failure to provide services.
A successful coordination of goal setting, monitoring and enforcement would improve 
links between natural resource exploitation and public welfare in developing countries.112  The 
same profit incentive that makes private companies efficient at exploiting natural resources 
would be applied to the provision of primary health.113  The influence that natural resource 
companies derive as wealth generators for government elites would also help ensure the success 
of their endeavors.  Eventually, if links to primary health care provision proved successful, 
110
 As stated this is a relative issue—problems like Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) and some other health 
provision issues are still very controversial.  But compared to the core nation building an attitude functions of 
education, these are less controversial. 
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 National identity and consciousness are more explicitly linked with particular school curricula than with the 
provision of basic health services.  While views on history can vary widely, basic medical procedures vary less and 
are less influential in shaping national consciousness.  Traditional medicine and other national symbols may increase 
national consciousness, but it is unlikely that traditional medical culture would be incompatible with child 
inoculation and other procedures crucial to basic primary health care.  Finally, any goal setting process would set 
specific goals that were appropriate to country conditions—this could include consideration of any local health care 
traditions important to national identity.
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 International financial institutions already have experience in setting and monitoring targets for complex projects.  
See, e.g., Wayne Arnold, Indonesia Vows to Pursue Economic Plan, NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 16, 2003, at W7.  To 
assist them, numerous consultancies have developed expertise in assessing private company’s performance against 
social, community development environmental criteria.  See, e.g., Shell Nigeria, supra note 60, at 28.
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 The idea that non-financial obligations would be forced onto natural resource companies is also not unusual.  
Project finance agreements increasingly specify that companies will meet environmental and social standards set by 
international financial institutions.  See, e.g., John W. Head, For Richer or for Poorer:  Assessing the Criticisms 
Directed at the Multilateral Development Banks, 52 Kan. L. Rev. 241, 280 (2004); Demetri Sevastopulos, Four 
Banks Adopt IFC Agreement, FINANCIAL TIMES, Apr. 7, 2003, at 17.
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developing countries and international donors could consider bringing the same model to other 
government activities.114
b.  Goal Setting
Setting challenging but achievable performance targets is crucial to ensuring that natural 
resource companies positively impact primary health care in developing countries.  International 
financial institutions that sponsor this program will have to create processes to set targets that 
natural resource companies are responsible for meeting.  This process should include wide 
consultations with numerous partners and aim to set achievable but challenging goals.  Crucial to 
the program’s success will be avoiding excessive lobbying by natural resource companies and 
their representatives.  Any goals that are set will also need to avoid interfering or drawing 
support from other necessary social programs.
Any goal setting process will need to include consultations with and representatives from 
numerous constituencies.  The consultations can include both information sharing and 
participation in the actual goal setting process.  These consultations can both leverage existing 
knowledge/ideas and create a feeling of shared ownership over the program.  Core constituencies 
that will definitely need to be consulted include representatives of the natural resource 
companies concerned, the developing country government, large donors to the government, 
international NGOs and domestic civil society institutions.115  The latter might include domestic 
NGOs, academic and journalists.116  These groups will need to decide the types of targets that 
114
 This assumption of responsibility might raise even greater normative concerns than the current proposal, and 
would need to be considered separately.
115
 While the Chad pipeline project conducted significant public consultations, these were marred by accusations that 
presentations were one sided.  See Uriz, supra note 13, at 220.  Consultations and discussions would need to be 
planned in conjunction with multiple civil society organizations.
116
 Local level consultations (as opposed to information sessions) may be difficult to achieve.  Communicating 
complicated ideas via video or text can be challenging, see Uriz, supra note 13, at 220-21.  Even simple security 
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must be met, and whether they consist solely of inputs (e.g. number of children immunized) or of 
outputs as well (e.g. child death rate).117
The most substantial part of the goal setting process will be choosing appropriate targets 
for extending primary health care.  It is vital that this process include input from the private 
sector corporations potentially responsible for implementing the plans (input would probably be 
solicited from all companies interested in bidding for a particular project).  These private 
corporations will help determine what targets might be impossible to actually achieve.118  To 
balance these cautionary views, local and international NGOs and other local civil society 
representatives, along with government officials can indicate their ideal in terms of increasing 
primary health care services.  The international financial institution coordinating the project can 
serve as a moderator, collecting proposals.  Eventually, a pre-set committee, composed of 
academics, development experts and officials from the financial institution can decide on the 
performance targets that will accompany any loans.  Prior coordination with natural resource 
companies should ensure that they accept these terms and take part in the project.  
The committee that decides on goals for improvement in primary health care can also be 
responsible for additional aspects of the project—e.g. the percentage of income normally 
allocated to the government which will be forfeited to help pay for the primary health care 
programs run the by the natural resource company.  All of these targets will be individualized for 
measures like security guards can complicate message delivery, Id., and village level meetings may subject 
individuals to social pressure for speaking freely.  Carefully chosen, local civil society partners may be more 
appropriate for gauging popular opinion.
117
 Input targets will be easier to measure but are not immediately linked with concrete results.  Output targets will 
be more difficult to tie directly to the efforts of natural resource companies.  In the consultation process described 
below, the full merits of choosing between these types of targets can be explored.  It is likely however that 
companies will resist any output targets, arguing that intervening events could undermine their best efforts.  In this 
case, it will be incumbent on the committee to propose input targets that are clearly linked to improved public 
health.
118
 While providing full developed country health care levels everywhere would be ideal, this program’s limitation is 
that overambitious targets will simply not be accepted by natural resource companies and will thus not be 
implemented.  More modest but actually realizable goals will thus be necessary.
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each developing country considered, depending on the size of the project being funded and 
particular country conditions.
In setting targets and engaging in consultations, the committee will need to avoid 
excessive attempts to lobby for particular results.  Natural resources companies can be expected 
to mobilize lobbyists to advocate for less challenging targets.119  They may also co-opt 
representatives from the developing country’s civil society and its government.120  Additionally, 
government and NGO representatives may try to exert public pressure for over-ambitious targets.  
In designing a goal setting process, specific rules on lobbying will need to be drawn up, with 
sanctions for excessive or dishonest attempts to influence committee members.  But these 
regulations can only be expected to address part of the problem.  Committee members, and the 
international financial institutions sponsoring them, will need to remain vigilant about attempts 
to influence their decision.  
A crucial challenge for the committee will involve setting targets that influence 
appropriate behavior.  Target setting for public services has had a mixed record in developed 
countries,121 and has in some cases let to behavior with negative social utility.  Appropriate 
targets will measure both quantity and quality of services provided.  They will also be set taking 
into account other programs that are underway in the developing country.  To the greatest extent 
possible, the committee setting these targets should try not to undermine existing social 
programs.  
119
 Oil companies can mobilize teams of experts, coalitions and political allies to advocate legal changes they 
support.  See, e.g., Andrew C. Revkin, Clashing Opinions at Meeting on Alaska Drilling, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2001, 
at A15.
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 Oil companies do this in developed countries as well, see id.
121 See, e.g., Tash Shifrin, Government Promises Targets Shakeup, GUARDIAN, Nov. 11, 2003, available at
http://society.guardian.co.uk/futureforpublicservices/story/0,8150,1082712,00.html.
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Target setting, even with input from a broad cross-section of concerned actors, runs the 
real risk of reducing efforts in other areas.  In the case of the natural resource companies 
concerned, it is almost certain that other social programs may be curtailed—this would be a 
natural consequence of the program’s focus on primary health care.  During consultations on 
target setting, concerned actors would be able to highlight the potential that particular, valuable 
social programs would be harmed by the targets set.  The committee setting these targets would 
then be able to evaluate these concerns and, when necessary, alter the targets.
c. Monitoring Activities
Monitoring the success of natural resource companies’ provision of primary health care will 
be crucial to assuring the success of this plan.  Successful monitoring will consider both the 
quality and quantity of health services provided, assisting with assessments of what progress has 
been made in meeting the targets agreed in the goal setting process.  This will enable the 
assignment of rewards or sanctions to the natural resources company responsible.  It could also 
allow feedback on ways that the goals might need to be changed.  Monitoring activities also 
provide an opportunity to make civil society actors meaningful partners in the project, helping to 
improve their cooperation with overall project goals.  Material incentives may be a useful way of 
encouraging NGOs and other civil society representatives to participate in monitoring.
  Successful monitoring activity is predicated on appropriate goal setting.  At least some of 
the targets set in this phase should be tied to easily measured performance indicators.  But targets 
need not all be quantitative and monitoring reports should not be universally tied to particular 
performance criteria.  Instead, a mix of qualitative and quantitative reports, some focusing on 
specific criteria and some not will yield the most appropriate results.
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Quantitative monitoring in response to particular targets is most easily imagined and will be 
very useful.  This type of monitoring might include statistics on the percentage of children 
receiving vaccinations, the number of primary care facilities, the number of people treated in 
primary health facilities, the percentage of deaths in childbirth, and other relevant statistics.122
Monitoring this type of data will be relatively simple—it is often already collected, though there 
are significant opportunities for improving data collection in particular developing countries.123
These statistics can also provide general information on the levels of investment natural resource 
companies are making and on the overall health impact this investment is having.
Qualitative monitoring will also be important, both independently and in response to 
particular targets.  These types of reports can include information on particular innovations that 
are being made, popular reaction to the increase in primary health care, and the means that 
natural resource companies use to achieve any quantitative targets that they set.  Qualitative 
reporting requirements also provide ideal opportunities for integrating NGOs and other civil 
society representatives.  These types of reports allow local representatives increased freedom to 
shape the structure of their reports around the particular concerns they are identifying.  Certain 
qualitative reports might even be procured with no pre-set requirements, but rather a request for 
an overall assessment.  These will be an ideal context with which to understand more focused 
qualitative and quantitative data.
Utilizing a large number of monitoring mechanisms is crucial because the data will be used 
to decided significant financial rewards and penalties.  The large financial import of the data 
makes it particularly important that information collected is accurate.  Using a large number of 
122
 This selection of goals deliberately includes potential input and output targets.  As discussed earlier, corporations 
may insist that only input targets be used.
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 See, e.g., HDI Report, supra note 6 at 208-17; WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WHO & UNICEF ESTIMATES 
OF NATIONAL IMMUNIZATION COVERAGE (2004), at http://www.who.int/vaccines-
surveillance/WHOUNICEF_Coverage_Review/.
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information gathering mechanisms will allow double checking of reports’ accuracy.  It will also 
reduce the ability of interested actors to influence the content of monitoring in ways that they 
find financially beneficial.  These potential wrongdoers could include not only the natural 
resource companies responsible for the provision of health care but potentially their financial 
competitors and/or governments seeking to obtain additional investment in their health care 
networks.
Monitoring will certainly need to include collection of official health care statistics and 
dedicated teams affiliated with international institutions sponsoring the project.  But involving 
local and international civil society institutions would significantly increase the number of 
monitoring mechanisms, as well as giving affected communities (e.g. international development 
professionals, domestic civil society members, and others) a sense of ownership over the project.
Official teams from the financial institution monitoring the project will be able to tailor their 
activities to the needs of the actual project.  Because monitoring will be one of their core 
activities, they will be able to collect specific data needed to measure progress towards meeting 
previously agreed goals.  They will also be an independent voice and relatively impervious to 
pressure from interested parties like natural resource companies and host governments.  These 
monitoring teams will form the base of the monitoring effort.
International development NGOs’ assistance with monitoring activities will provide valuable 
alternative perspectives.  Many international development NGOs are skeptical of natural 
resource companies and international financial institutions.124  Their alternative perspectives will 
provide a good balance to the views of official teams, who while independent of outside actors, 
may be affected by their institutions’ sponsorship of the project.  Involving international 
124 See, e.g., OXFAM, THE IMF AND THE MILLENIUM GOALS:  FAILING TO DELIVER FOR LOW INCOME COUNTRIES
(2003); CHRISTIAN AID, FUELLING POVERTY:  OIL, WAR AND CORRUPTION (2003).
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development NGOs might also provide them with a greater sense of project ownership.  This
could encourage constructive engagement with criticisms, rather than media campaigns that 
could undermine the entire project’s success.
Domestic civil society representatives are the third prong of a successful monitoring effort.  
Involving local NGOs, media, government officials and others in the project will help ensure that 
local perspectives are adequately represented.  Domestic civil society institutions will have local 
connections and insights that official teams and international NGOs may lack.  Some of these 
groups’ members will directly experience the primary health care provided through oil revenues, 
a perspective that other monitors will not share.  Giving domestic civil society groups a sense of 
ownership in the project will also reduce nationalistic protests.  Providing real opportunities for 
all sectors of society, including the government, to see the new services for themselves might 
also reduce suspicions that the project is undertaken to benefit any particular group in society—
e.g. the government or opposition parties.  
Data collected by monitors does not have to be used exclusively to determine sanctions and 
rewards for the natural resource company concerned.  The reports may also provide evidence of 
particular approaches to primary health care that should be replicated in other societies.  They 
may also be used in constructive dialogue with the responsible natural resource company.  
Encouraging monitors and those they monitor to discuss their findings could lead to useful group 
problem solving and even partnerships to address particular roadblocks.  This type of activity 
could also reduce strains in relationships that monitoring could introduce in the developing 
country.  An eventual goal of the monitoring program should be for civil society monitors to 
involve themselves more in facilitating development—both alone and in conjunction with those 
they are monitoring. 
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d.  Enforcement
Enforcement mechanisms will motivate natural resources companies to comply with pre-
agreed goals.  Preferably, enforcement mechanisms will combine a system of inducements with a 
penalty system. Whatever system is designed will need to be significant enough to influence 
resource allocation decisions of the companies concerned.  In order to reassure all parties to the 
process, the enforcement system will need to be administered by an independent Board whose 
decisions can then be appealed.   This Board will assess criteria previously agreed to by all 
parties, collected by the international financial institution concerned and, in the case of penalties, 
enforced through western court systems. The Board will also need to consider situations where 
goals were not achieved for reasons beyond the control of natural resource companies—as 
specified in loan agreements with international resource companies.
1.  Enforcement Procedures
An independent Board constituted according to preset procedures will be crucial to both 
the effectiveness and the legitimacy of any enforcement system.  This Board will need to 
regularly assess progress against previously agreed criteria set out in project agreements between 
these companies and international financial institutions.  It will then need to decide on what 
inducements or penalties are appropriate.  The decisions of the Board will need to be both public 
and open to appeal by both international financial institutions and the natural resource 
companies.
The rules of procedure for the Board (and, relatedly, its membership) which monitors 
these contracts will need to be drafted with care.  Some of these rules can be derived from 
existing codes like those drafted for international arbitration by organizations like the 
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International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)125 and the the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).126  Others will need to be 
specifically crafted to ensure that the Board is independent and focused on regularly measuring 
progress in the implementation of primary health care (as opposed to rendering isolated 
decisions).  Additionally, unlike international arbitrators (who generally change for every 
arbitration), the Board’s membership will be relatively unchanging, with members serving for 
fixed time periods. 
Given the Board’s mission to regularly measure progress in meeting primary health care 
commitments, it will need to develop a speedy process for considering evidence while still 
giving a fair hearing to the reports of very diverse parties.  To accomplish this, rules of document 
submission for all parties will need to be strict, with early deadlines and responses to specific 
data requests by the Board.  NGOs’, especially ones from the country concerned, may be given 
additional leeway in order to accommodate their more limited resources and the importance of 
creating a feeling of ownership over the natural resources project.  Representatives of the natural 
resources companies and other entities will also need to be available for conversations with the 
Board about the information it is considering.  
Depending on the particular loan agreement, the particular targets and types of progress 
the Board measures will adjust from case to case, and it will need to accept evidence and 
information from a very wide variety of parties, including national governments, national and 
international lenders and NGOs.  The Board will be particularly useful in the event of mixed 
progress against key benchmarks (e.g. exceeding some but falling short on others).  In this case, 
125 See INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS 
AND RULES, available at www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc.htm
126 See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 17, 
Annex I, at 81, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (1985); 24 I.L.M. 1302.
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even with the clearest benchmarks possible, a balancing will need to take place, and an
independent Board is more likely to be trusted by the concerned parties than a simple committee 
formed by the lenders.  In the long term, the Board would also be able to recommend on whether 
goals and/or inducements/penalties should be restructured to more accurately reflect 
circumstances encountered by the natural resource company.
In order for the enforcement mechanism and the Board to be successful, it will be 
important to obtain strong consensus when particular inducements/penalties are linked to specific 
goals. These inducements/penalties are not meant to be independent revenue generators but 
rather mechanisms that influence compliance with pre-set targets.  Additionally, the enforcement 
mechanism should be easy to implement—to reduce both the possibility of natural resource 
companies “gaming the system” and to give the appearance of transparency, which will be 
important for the program’s overall credibility.  This suggests that any enforcement system 
should be almost wholly financial in impact.  
During the goal setting process, careful thought must be given to the exact mix of 
enforcement techniques that are appropriate for a particular lending project.  Factors that might 
need to be taken into account include the rigor of the goals agreed to, the types of enforcement 
procedures that a natural resource company will agree to be subjected to in order to participate in 
the project, and the impact that particular enforcement measures will have on the natural 
resource company involved.  The ultimate goal will always be to ensure that the company meets 
or exceeds challenging goals in the provision of primary health care.  This will require balancing 
the rigor of the goals and the magnitude of inducements/penalties.
A final consideration when setting up a Board is that its decisions can both be submitted 
to speedy international arbitration and that they are enforceable in national courts.  Loan 
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agreements should set out a clear set of criteria under which decisions of the Board’s decisions 
will be subject to an arbitration process.  These should allow for speedy consideration of 
evidence and decisions.  This option to appeal may increase the confidence of natural resource 
companies in the process and thus their willingness to participate.  Concomitantly though, the 
legal framework in any loan agreement should clearly provide for a right to recovery in multiple 
national jurisdictions for any financial penalties.  This will be different from standard contract 
clauses allowing lenders to demand immediate repayment under particular conditions.  Instead, it 
will usually demand a penalty for not having met targets but proceed on the assumption the 
primary health care program will continue under the aegis of the natural resource company, 
unless there is an absolute failure to meet primary health care targets.
The Board should be open to submissions by NGOs, host governments and other third 
parties.  But appeals from its decisions should be allowed only by the specific lenders and 
borrowers.  This will provide some security to natural resource companies worried that activist 
NGOs or host governments may decide to try and enforce tougher standards than those 
previously agreed to.  More broadly, the Board itself should be the same for all loan contracts 
completed under this framework.  Though the exact conditions for the loan may differ, having a 
consistent membership and set of procedures for the evaluating Board will make the process 
more predictable and the responsibilities of natural resource companies clearer.
2.  Inducements
Inducements will be relatively uncomplicated and primarily provided by the international 
financial institutions sponsoring the project.  These inducements will be mostly financial, 
including reduced interest payments, extended repayment periods and/or other financial rewards.  
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The exact triggers for award of these inducements will apply will be determined the goal setting 
section.  But it would be reasonable to expect these if natural resource companies over deliver on 
key primary health care targets.
Additional incentives for good performance on pre-assigned targets will include positive 
press coverage and may extend to preferential consideration for future projects by both the 
developing country government and the international financial institution.  Natural resource 
companies which are financially rewarded for improving primary health care will be able to use 
this award in their public relations campaigns and as proof of the positive impact they have on 
the developing world.  This could be an extremely valuable fringe-benefit to the purely financial 
incentives.127  It is also likely that good performance in providing primary health care will yield 
additional opportunities for cooperation with the international financial institution and 
developing country governments.  These opportunities could be formally codified as additional 
incentives.  But even if not officially provided, a publicized positive track record in this regard 
will almost inevitably make it easier to obtain additional contracts.
3. Penalties
Penalties for failing to meet pre-set targets will be more complex to implement than 
inducements.  In some cases, they may not be appropriate at all because of the inherent tension 
and legal complexities they give rise to.  But if they are necessary, a number of additional 
considerations will have to be taken into account.  The supervising Board will need to calculate 
these penalties in an open, previously agreed and transparent way.  International Financial 
Institutions will then need to collect these awards, possibly using developed world legal systems 
127
 Oil companies like Shell have demonstrated how important they feel this type of publicity is by issuing auditor 
approved reports on their ethical and environmental behavior.  See SHELL REPORT, supra note 65.
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to enforce judgments against the companies concerned.  The possibility of open legal battles over 
penalties will encourage natural resource companies to comply with any judgments against them
to avoid reinforcing public relations problems.
As with inducements, the process of setting penalties will need to be previously agreed in 
order to avoid giving rise to disputes.  Because of the large financial and public relations impact 
these penalties can have, natural resource companies can be expected to lobby heavily against 
their imposition.  This will make it crucial that the procedures used and penalties applied are 
very clearly delineated beforehand, and that their application is not subject to widely differing 
interpretation.  The penalties will almost certainly be financial and will depend on the extent to 
which pre-agreed targets were not met.  
One potentially challenging aspect of any penalty program will be ensuring that any 
monetary awards are collected.  It will be crucial to ensure that any contracts signed can be 
enforced by national courts in countries where natural resource companies have assets that can 
be impounded.  Any court ruling exempting natural resource companies from penalties will 
seriously undermine incentives to comply with previously agreed targets in primary health care 
provision.  Assuring adequate courtroom enforcement of penalties will be especially crucial in 
the case of natural resource companies based in jurisdictions where the judiciary may not reliably 
enforce contracts (e.g. China and other developing countries).128  In the case of companies like 
these, enforcement provisions may be less useful or may need to be secured by assets in 
countries with more reliable judicial systems.
128 See, e.g., Volz supra note 110, at 904.
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Given the increasing acceptance of international arbitration and the enforcement of cross-
border contracts,129 it is not unrealistic to expect at least some court systems to fully support 
efforts by international financial institutions to collect penalties decided by the Board.  The 
actual procedure of the Board will be more similar to that of various UN human rights 
committees which meet regularly to assess progress towards particular goals by nation states 
than to court decisions.130  But styling the Board’s deliberations as the results of international 
arbitration may make them seem more familiar and acceptable to national courts.131  Thus, the 
loan agreements specifying the existence of the Board and its procedures may need to constitute 
it as a pre-authorized arbitration panel—rather than a completely new entity with which 
enforcing national courts have no experience.  Conveniently, large natural resource companies 
often possess far flung holdings in numerous countries—making it easier to enforce the award in 
jurisdictions more open to enforcing penalties agreed by international arbitration.132  In this 
sense, large natural resource companies are much more vulnerable to international pressure than 
governments, as they do not possess ultimate control over a particular geographical area where 
most of their resources are concentrated.
A non-legal motivator for natural resources companies’ compliance with penalties for not 
meeting pre-set goals are the strong public relations and credibility blows they will suffer 
129
 An example of this was the impounding of a Ukrainian plane, by a Belgian court on the order of a Swedish Court 
of Arbitration in a dispute with a Cypriot company.  See Melnik, supra note 111.
130
 The actual deliberations of the UN human rights committees are relatively secretive and time consuming, often 
taking years before condemnation and action.  See DAVID WEISSBRODT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:  
LAW, POLICY AND PROCESS 156-72 (3rd. ed. 2001).  While monitoring of natural resources companies would be 
more public and action swifter, it would share an emphasis on yearly/continuous monitoring.  Additionally, given 
the highly specific nature of arbitration agreements, there should be no problems in setting up a Board with 
permanent members whose judgments can, in certain cases, be appealed to a more standard international arbitration 
panel.  
131
 Some national courts are still reluctant to enforce international arbitration agreements, see, e.g., Volz, supra note 
110 at 870, but these would still be more acceptable than a new and untried international procedure.  
132
 For example, Belgium is noted for enforcing international arbitration awards, with relatively minimal judicial 
control over enforcement of awards.  See, id. at 895.  Other European Union nations also have a good record 
enforcing foreign arbitration awards.  See, id. at 894. 
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otherwise.  This is especially the case for western natural resource companies, whose “clean” 
reputation is most developed and valuable.  For these companies, failing to meet goals in primary 
health care provision will negatively affect public relations.  Any court battles against penalties 
will increase coverage of their failure and could also reinforce perceptions that they care less 
about developing social capital than they claim.133  Additionally, companies that refuse to pay 
penalties may suffer official or unofficial penalties when bidding for additional contracts with 
international financial institutions or developing country governments (as well as seriously 
damaging their public image).  These factors should ensure that carefully structured penalty 
programs are not continuously challenged in court.
Any Board considering the performance of natural resource companies will need to 
consider extenuating circumstances.  These can be partially negotiated in advance but the board 
will also need to consider unforeseen ones as they arrive.  Factors like civil wars and natural 
disasters such as earthquakes are obviously beyond natural resources companies’ control.  
Boards will need to decide whether these types of events justify deviations from previously 
agreed targets and what magnitude this deviation may be.  But the powers (and limitations) of 
the Board in this case will need to be clearly delineated in the loan agreement, in order to reduce 
the ability of natural resource companies to challenge penalties based on open ended definitions 
of circumstances beyond their control.
e.Potential Impact
Making natural resources companies responsible for promoting primary health care 
development in areas within which they invest will bring significant benefits.  Natural resources 
companies have demonstrated their ability to achieve their goals in developing countries.134
133
 For examples of the types of claims that would be undermined, see, e.g., SHELL REPORT, supra note 65.
134 See discussion in section IV.
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Linking natural resource development with improvements in primary health care is an excellent 
way of aligning natural resource companies’ profit making incentives with broader societal 
goals.  
As discussed in Section III, natural resource companies have significant influence over 
developing countries.  Their activities are major revenue producers for the government and their 
requests are taken extremely seriously.  More broadly, natural resource companies can be a 
powerful example of best practices for domestic businesses—with their business operations 
training business and political elites.  The positive—and negative—impact of natural resource 
companies’ policies and values on developing country elites is hard to overstate.
Ensuring that primary health care has a significant impact on natural resource companies’ 
revenues has the potential to affect programs beyond those directly focused on primary health 
promotion.  Correctly aligned programs may induce natural resource companies to make primary 
health care promotion a central component of many activities.  Companies will have an incentive 
to pressure governments into promoting sensible health care policies that will help them meet 
their pre-set targets.  Natural resource companies may also be able to mobilize local businesses 
to assist it with efforts to promote primary health care programs.  Ideally, all employees in 
particular developing countries will be encouraged to consider the primary health care impact of 
their projects and to assist in promoting particular campaigns/goals.  This mobilization of society 
would assist in conserving and increasing company profits.  But it could also lead to a new focus 
on primary health care by wide swaths of developing country elites.
More broadly, international development NGOs and other organizations assisting with 
development will also have an incentive to cooperate with natural resources companies 
participating in this program.  The integral role that the company will be required to take in 
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promoting primary health care will require cooperation.  NGOs will need to engage the selected 
corporation to remain relevant on the issue of primary health care—but the corporation will also 
have an incentive to use NGOs’ expertise in primary health care development.  This cooperation 
between entities that have often had hostile relations in the past could lead to significant learning 
opportunities and additional cooperation particular development projects, beyond the specific 
country and in sectors other than primary health care.  
The goal setting, monitoring and enforcement measures which are developed should take 
into account the ability of companies to transform their entire behavior and that of the societies 
they interact with.  Effort which pour short term resources into programs that meet particular 
primary health care goals may be less sustainable that others which focus on company and 
society-wide behavior.  Appropriately structured goal, monitoring and enforcement efforts will 
reward sustainable efforts by natural resource companies.  
Section VI:  Practical Challenges
The ideas outlined above are an extension of current efforts but are still relatively radical.
Making private sector natural resource companies responsible for meeting core primary care 
targets in developing countries could fundamentally alter relationships between international 
financial institutions, governments, private sector corporations and civil society actors.  Before 
even considering this type of plan, some key challenges need to be addressed.  These include:  
whether natural resource companies are actually equipped to handle primary health provision on 
a national level; whether companies, civil society actors and especially developing country 
governments will be willing to cooperate with this program; the vulnerability of this program to 
cheating by governments or corporations and the enforceability of legal constraints on 
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companies.  Though it is hard to address all these issues definitively, it seems clear that none are 
so compelling as to overturn the rational for this program.
A basic challenge to this proposal is whether natural resource companies will actually 
have the capacity to reach challenging targets for improvements in primary care provision on a 
national level.  Their organizational expertise is in extracting, refining and marketing natural 
resources and their experience promoting health care is often limited to their employees and 
regions around their key production sites.  Some critics would suggest that employing a third 
party contractor to undertake a health promotion program and requiring payments to them by the 
natural resource company could be a better way of achieving key targets.
Unfortunately, primary health care if often so terrible that basic increases in 
efficient/uncorrupt delivery mechanisms would be a giant improvement.  As discussed 
previously, certain developing nations’ primary health care spending has a very low impact 
because of public sector inefficiency/corruption.135  More broadly, the experience of natural 
resource companies in providing social services to regional areas should be very useful when 
providing more limited services on a national scale.  The companies themselves could contract 
with other organizations to provide particular sets of services and would be able to use the most 
efficient means of meeting/exceeding the goals that have been set.  The ability of natural 
resource companies to radically restructure themselves when the business climate requires it 
suggests that this responsibility would not be beyond the companies’ abilities.136 Most 
significantly, ensuring that the natural resource companies’ are directly involved in the provision 
135 See e.g., Filmer, supra note 8 at 15-19; Gupta, supra note 51.
136
 In the unlikely case of large natural resource companies ceasing operations/otherwise withdrawing from the 
project, their health care operations would need to be continued by national governments and/or NGOs.  
Theoretically, while the operations would lose the extra clout brought by being run by a large investor, the actual 
operations will continue to run under new management, and the revenues from the relevant national resources will 
be transferred to the government and/or new owners (potentially the international financial institutions who are 
creditors of the natural resource company)—still able to fund the health activities. 
53
of primary care leverages a key asset they possess: sufficient influence and experience to achieve 
targets in environments that have corrupt and inefficient government actors.  
A second challenge to this program is the willingness of companies, civil society actors 
and governments to participate in the program.  Each set of actors has its own agendas, many of 
which do not make promoting primary health care in developing countries a high priority.  More 
broadly, it will take the agreement of a large number of international actors to make this program 
work.  If any of these actors creates obstacles, the experiment could fail.
A key way of addressing this challenge is taking account of the individual parties’ 
interests.  As was obvious from the Chad oil pipeline project and the experiences of 
multinationals like Shell and BP, it is possible to create an environment in which unlikely parties 
find it in their interest to advance social goals not immediately connected to their individual 
aims.  Natural resource companies in particular are able to show great flexibility in their 
operations if their profits depend on it.  In situations like the Chad oil pipeline, where 
international financial institutions’ cooperation is needed in order to achieve specific goals, they 
will probably be amenable to cooperating with social programs like primary health care 
promotion.  Their record of supporting community development elsewhere137 suggests this type 
of support is possible for them, especially in a situation that provides for a healthy corporate 
profit margin.
Civil society actors are diverse in their interests and motivations.  Ensuring that they 
cooperate will probably require multiple approaches.  But a combination of financial rewards for 
assisting with monitoring activities, active consultation and the promise of influence and press 
attention will probably be useful tools for both domestic and international NGOs.  The broad 
137 See discussion in section III.
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benefits of primary health care promotion are also close to the mission statements of many 
NGOs, who will be particularly likely to participate in the project.
Probably the most difficult actors to convince will be developing country governments.  
It is their asset distribution systems that are being questioned by this program, and the program 
will reduce the resources under the direct control of the government.  Removing the 
opportunities for patronage and power that oil resources provide governments will reduce their 
desire to support any natural resource development or cooperate with either international 
financial institutions, civil society groups or even private sector natural resource extractors.  To 
address these problems, it is crucial that developing country governments be given direct control 
of a portion of the revenue, which provides an incentive for them to cooperate with the program. 
Those revenues allocated to the developing country government may be money wasted, but can 
be seen as a facilitation payment to allow more effective promotion of the public good by outside 
actors.  
Convincing all actors to cooperate is obviously a complicated problem.  In situations 
where projects can go ahead even without international financial institutions, it may be much 
harder to initiate an experiment like the one described.  But, as the Chad pipeline case 
demonstrates, there are at least some circumstances in which international financial institutions 
hold enough trump cards to convince other actors to take part in the program.
A third challenge to the viability of this program is the vulnerability to cheating by 
natural resource companies, national governments or NGOs.  Chad’s breaching of its 
international agreements soon after it signed them demonstrates the very real threat that contracts 
will not be honored.  Natural resource companies and governments may have strong incentives 
to reduce spending on primary health care if they can divert these resources to their own ends.  
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They may also be tempted to collude with each other, especially once the project has been 
completed and international financial institutions can no longer withhold funds for the project.
Setting up effective monitoring systems is the first step in addressing this challenge.  
Section V outlines the importance of both dedicated monitoring teams and recruiting civil 
society partners to assist with the monitoring process.  A core part of the proposal is this realistic 
assessment of whether primary health care targets are met.  The variety of monitoring 
mechanisms will make it harder for natural resources companies to skew results in their favor.  A 
mix of qualitative and quantitative goals, and the subjective assessment of a committee of 
experts will also help prevent efforts to respect the letter of the targets while ignoring their spirit.  
National governments will also have a strong incentive to allow primary care provision to go 
ahead unimpeded, if only because this could improve their own popularity with voters.  
Governments who want to favor some regions or punish others may be dissuaded by pressure 
from natural resource companies, which may face sanctions for uneven development.
A particularly challenging problem will develop if the government and natural resource 
companies collude to skew reporting and divert funds away from primary health care.  
Governments can reduce the ability of civil society representatives to report on targets through 
repressive measures, especially if natural resource companies cooperate.  In this case, the formal 
monitoring teams discussed in Section IV will be extremely important, as will the sanctions 
assessed if this collusion is discovered.  Any natural resource company that participates in this 
kind of collusion will need to given exemplary punishment, with heavy fines, significant bad 
publicity and a potential ban on future cooperation with international financial institutions.  Even 
these types of measures may not totally prevent cheating.  But thoughtful goal setting, 
monitoring and assessment should be able to significantly reduce the scope for cheating.
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Beyond the specific parameters of this program, any corrupt actions taken by 
corporations could lead to significant consequences because of regulations in anti-corruption 
frameworks like the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and the OECD convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.138
Engaging in corrupt actions to evade the primary health care requirements could bring heavy 
penalties beyond the confines of this program.  
The existence of the FCPA and OECD frameworks may also dissuade companies from 
engaging in corrupt behavior in order to achieve (as opposed to evading) the health care goals.  
There is the potential that natural resource companies would sanction the bribing of government 
officials to cooperate with health care programs designed to meet previously agreed targets.  
While less troubling than bribing to avoid targets,139 any encouragement to additional corruption 
in developing countries would constitute a significant negative impact of the program.  The 
FCPA allows facilitation payments to promote expedited government action,140 and it is exactly 
these types of bribes that might increase as a natural resource company sought to achieve pre-set 
targets.  But these payments have generally been limited to less than $1000 in practice,141 and 
any large deviations from this would probably be declared illegal.142  Given the law and the 
138 See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-23, 91 Stat. 1494, (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)-(h), 78dd-2, 78ff (1994)), amended by International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 
1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3, 78ff (West Supp. 1999); Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 337 I.L.M. 8.  The OECD convention has been 
signed by all OECD countries, covering all the major developing countries where most natural resource companies 
would be based.  See Walter Perkel, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 683, 684 n.6 (2003).
139
 A bribe with health care targets met seems a better bargain that bribe with health care targets not met, all else 
being equal.
140 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b) (1994) (for issuers); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b) (1994) (for domestic concerns); 15 U.S.C. §§ 
78dd-3(b) (1994 & West Supp. 2000) (for any person).
141 See, e.g., Arthur F. Mathews, Defending SEC and DOJ FCPA Investigations and Conducting Related Corporate 




relatively extensive monitoring of this project as discussed in Section V, it would be foolhardy 
for natural resource companies to go beyond the allowed facilitation payments.
Another type of collusion that could cause concern is the effective “buying” of NGOs.  
This would involve natural resource companies bribing local NGOs engaged in monitoring 
programs to produce positive reports about their activities.  This type of collusion would escape 
sanction under the FCPA and OECD frameworks, as they deal with the bribing of government 
officials rather than NGO officials.143  In cases like this, international financial institutions would 
need to rely on the diversity of reporting sources (including international NGOs and local 
governments).  Additionally, if this type of cheating appears to be significant, it will be possible 
for international financial institutions to dispatch additional independent monitors who can check 
the information submitted by local NGOs.  Those that are found unreliable can be dropped from 
the program.  As in the case where government officials are bribed, corporations that engaged in 
these types of payments would need to be sanctioned in an exemplary fashion. 
A second set of challenges may develop after the project is completed.  The government 
will have the facilities to allow income generation independent of loans/grants from developed 
nations and international financial institutions.  Though the natural resources company will still 
be able to influence the government and will still be vulnerable to punishments, the government 
could theoretically nationalize the assets concerned and ignore the international community.  But 
given the size of the assets concerned, this type of action would have repercussions far beyond 
simple primary care provision.  The nationalization would create significant new problems for 
the government concerned and would be taken up by the broader international community.  
While this might not guarantee primary health care provision, the broad negative consequences 
143 See, Perkel, supra note 140 at 692-94.
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of nationalizations would dissuade most developing country governments from reverting to 
them.144
The challenges discussed above are only some of those that this program would face if it 
were to be implemented.  But they form some of the key questions that need to be answered.  As 
discussed above, none are compelling enough to stop the program being implemented.  Instead, 
they raise points to be discussed more fully in any goal setting stage, where targets and 
incentives would be structured to take into account these types of concerns.
Section VII:  Conclusion
The proposal outlined in Part V could have radical consequences for the relationships of 
governments, the private sector, civil society and International Organizations.  The potential 
risks—to national sovereignty, target populations and the like—would not be acceptable if all 
developing country populations were receiving even fair primary health care provision.  But the 
frequent, abject failure of developing country governments to provide key social services like 
primary health care to their people make radical steps like the ones proposed in this program 
acceptable.  If this experiment succeeds, it could open the way for significant improvements in 
the way that a variety of core services are now provided to developing country populations.
The key impetus for the proposal in Section V is the growing appreciation of the 
international community that developing country governments have regularly failed to mobilize 
natural resources wealth to benefit their general populations.  Some commentators have even 
viewed natural resources as a “curse”145 and suggested that countries without these resources are 
better off.  This proposal does not deal with all the negative consequences that natural resource 
144
 An additional point to make about the threat of nationalization is that governments’ ability to exercise this option 
(albeit with negative consequences) rebuts to some extent accusations that this program gives natural resource 
companies too much control/influence in developing countries.  The governments’ ultimate prerogatives still stand 
under this proposal.
145 See, e.g., Xavier Sala-i-martin, supra note 17.
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wealth brings with it, but in improving the efficiency and equity of their distribution does reduce 
the possibility of conflict over unfair/privileged enjoyment of core revenue streams.  The 
proposal incorporates the international community’s growing appreciation for the efficiencies of 
private enterprise and extends current experiments in using the private sector.  The efficiency of 
private sector corporations can be harnessed by innovative legal agreements and the opportunity 
to enforce these agreements worldwide, evading the problems posed by less-developed countries 
legal systems.  Though radical, this approach is not completely out of step with current 
initiatives—instead it reflects and builds on the experience of current experiments like the Chad 
oil pipeline.
The approach discussed may not work in all situations.  It is best suited to those situations 
where international financial institutions’ contributions are essential to the project’s going 
forward—and especially when developing country governments have few alternative resources 
to exploit.  But these are exactly the situations where primary health care provision is often at its 
worst, and where the benefits of outside provision may be most keenly felt.  The circumstances 
in which this program would most likely be accepted are fortuitously those where it would be 
most needed.
If this proposal did succeed in significantly improving access to primary health care, 
there would be scope for expanding its application.  Other core social services, like primary 
education, might also benefit from private sector involvement.  While this would pose different 
challenges than the provision of primary health care, it could be the beginning of an even more 
radical experiment in assuring that citizens of resource rich countries are provided core 
prerequisites for social and economic development.  Changing natural resources from a “curse” 
into a real benefit would be a revolution in international affairs worth supporting.
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